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INTRODUCTION
"Certainly many of us never anticipated that states would become addicted to
the tobacco money as a way to finance their operations."
- Scott Harshbarger, Attorney General, State of Massachusetts
1
This article discusses the effects of the largest legal settlement in United
States history: the so-called Master Settlement Agreement2 , or "MSA."
Part I discusses the settlement generally, and its intended effect on the U.S.
tobacco market. Parts II through IV discuss the unintended consequences
of the settlement.' Part II considers how states got into their current disar-
ray, and how a perceived state windfall of billions of dollars ended up put-
ting states on what by all accounts now appears to be very real risk of insol-
vency. Part III examines how the major tobacco companies are using the
states' dire financial condition to stifle tribal sovereignty and Indian indus-
try. Part IV analyzes the federal government's role in similar oppressive
tactics. The concluding section suggests lessons that might be learned from
the MSA. In sum, it appears that state attorneys generals' encroachment up-
on state legislatures' policy-making, effectively binding each state into a
deal with the major tobacco companies, resulted in a benefit only to "Big
Tobacco" companies and not the states.
In addition, tribal governments have suffered the brunt of the abuse in
that states and the federal government have effectively been forced to attack
tribal sovereignty at the behest of these major tobacco companies. In the
modern era of states' rights,4 from a purely legal perspective "it is simple
enough for many states and local governments - as well most federalism
commentators - to ignore Indian nations.
Gordon Fairclough & Vanessa O'Connell, Co-Dependents: Once Tobacco Foes, States Are Hooked on
Settlement Cash - Philip Morris Verdict Sparks Scramble to Shield Firm, WALL ST. J., April 2, 2003, at
Al.
2 Id. See generally Andrew J. Haile & Matthew W. Krueger-Andes, Landmark Settlements and Unin-
tended Consequences, 44 U. TOL. L. REV. 145 (2012).
See generally Haile & Krueger-Andes, supra note 2.
See generally David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights,
Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MiNN. L. REV. 267 (2002).
5 Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 77 MONT. L. REV. 28 (forthcoming 2015)
(citing Steven Paul McSloy, Border Wars: Haudenosaunee Lands and Federalism, 46 BUFF. L. REV.
1041, 1041-42 (1998)).
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However, on a practical level, states can no more ignore tribal interests
than they can federal interests, which often overlap.6 As noted by Justice
Sandra Day O'Conner: "Today in the United States, we have three types of
sovereign entities - the Federal government, the States, and the Indian
tribes. Each of the three sovereigns has its own judicial system, and each
plays an important role in the administration of justice in this country."'
Through a series of legal determinations in the 2 1st century, it has become
clear that tribal governments have certain authorities. For example, tribal
governments may levy their own taxes and regulate their own lands and
persons who enter those lands and to do so without state interference. The
result is "a new conception of federalism that includes a very active third
sovereign."8 Although "[t]he longstanding legal debate within federalism
has been primarily over the appropriate distribution of sovereign authority
to wield decision-making power between the national government and the
[s]tates," state and federal policymakers can no longer ignore that "govern-
mental decision-making authority in the United States involves not only the
national and state governments, but also the tribal nations."9 Unfortunately,
by means of the MSA, Big Tobacco has forced states and the federal gov-
ernment to flout this conception of federalism by (1) upsetting the distribu-
tion of regulatory authority vis-hi-vis these three sovereigns, and (2) denying
tribal governments any decision-making authority in regard to state and
federal law and policy that has a direct effect on the political integrity, eco-
nomic security, and health and welfare of these governments and their citi-
zens.10
I. THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENTS
In May of 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed the first
state mass tort lawsuit against the tobacco industry.11 The suit alleged that
6 See generally Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
' Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1
(1997).
8 Nancy Carol Carter, American Indians and Law Libraries: Acknowledging the Third Sovereign, 94
LAW. LIBR. J. 7, 13 (2002).
9 Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 318 (2003).
'" See generally Nicholas C. Zaferatos, Planning the Native American Tribal Community: Understand-
ing the Basis of Power Controlling the Reservation Territory, 64 J. AM. PLAN. ASSN 395 (1998) (citing
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)).
" Complaint, Moore v. American Tobacco Co., No. 94-1429 (Jackson Cnty. Miss. Ch. Ct. May 23,
1994), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf assets/ms complaint.pdf [hereinafter
Mississippi Complaint]. The suits were filed by attorneys experienced in mass tort litigation who "were
convinced that the unfolding revelations of the tobacco industry's indifference to public health concerns
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the country's largest tobacco manufacturers - also known as "Big Tobac-
co "12 - "manufactured, tested, designed, promoted, marketed, packaged,
sold, distributed, and/or placed into the stream of commerce in and into the
State numerous brands of defective, unreasonably dangerous and hazardous
cigarettes," thereby causing Mississippi to "suffer[] harm and has incur[]
significant expenses associated with the provision of necessary health care
and other such necessary assistance under various State programs to certain
eligible citizens numbering in the thousands who suffer, or who have suf-
fered, from tobacco-related injuries, diseases or sickness."1 3 Moore and his
colleagues' theory was to "sue on behalf of states, which had not chosen to
smoke but were still being forced to pay health care costs, and that the to-
bacco companies had gotten rich because of it."1 4 Other states soon fol-
lowed. For the next three years, the states' attorneys unearthed via discov-
ery 1 5 numerous secret tobacco documents showing that Big Tobacco "knew
cigarettes were addictive and dangerous," purposefully hid this information
from the public, and even "intentionally target[ed] minors with their adver-
tising. ' q6
By 1997, after several more states filed similar lawsuits, Big Tobacco
negotiated with a group of State Attorneys Generals to reach a comprehen-
could be translated into mass industry liability, as in asbestos litigation." Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco
Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 331, 337 (2001) (citing PETER PRINGLE,
CORNERED: BIG TOBACCO AT THE BAR OF JUSTICE 13-15 (1998)).
12 See Craig P. Raysor, From the Sword to the Pen: A History and Current Analysis of U.S. Tobacco
Marketing Regulations, 13 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 497, 508-14 (2008) (discussing the "Big Tobacco's...
take over [of] the bulk of the tobacco industry"). As of 2001, Philip Morris, Inc.; R.J. Reynolds Tobac-
co Co., Inc.; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.; and Lorillard Tobacco Co., all original signatories to
the MSA, were responsible for 98% of cigarette sales in the United States. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co.
v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 2001). What is more, it appears that they are now in
the process of merging. Press Release, Reynolds American Inc., Reynolds American to Acquire Lo-
rillard in Transaction Valued At $27.4 Billion (July 15, 2014), available at http://www.prnewswrecom/
news-releases/reynolds-american-to-acquire-lorillard-in-transaction-valued-at-274-billion-267143881 .ht
MIl.
'3 Mississippi Complaint, supra note 11, at 1.
'4 Mark Curriden, Up in Smoke: How Greed, Hubris and High-Stakes Lobbying Laid Waste to the $246
Billion Tobacco Settlement, 93 A.B.A. J. 26, 27 (2007) (quoting Richard Scruggs, co-counsel for the
State of Mississippi). See generally CURTIS WILKIE, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS (2010) (depict-
ing the story of Richard Scrggs, arguably the most successful plaintiff's lawyer in America).
'5 See, e.g. Michael V. Ciresi et al., Decades of Deceit: Document Discovery in the Minnesota Tobacco
Litigation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 477 (1999).
16 Curriden, supra note 14, at 28. The various suits also alleged claims of civil conspiracy, willful and
negligent breach of a special duty, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, negligent de-
sign, strict liability, unfair trade practices, public nuisance, negligent and intentional entrustment, and
even "intentionally ... targeting African Americans" with their defective product. A.D. Bedell Whole-
sale Co., 263 F.3d at 242 n.10 (citation omitted). The unearthed documents are generally available
online. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY DOCUMENTS: WHAT THEY ARE, WHAT
THEY TELL US, AND HOW TO SEARCH THEM (2d ed. 2004).
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sive, nationwide settlement of the states' claims.1 On the heels of numer-
ous tort lawsuits where individual plaintiffs would eventually amass billions
of dollars worth of judgments on their own,1 8 a settlement that would fully
and finally immunize Big Tobacco from any further personal injury litiga-
tion was warmly received. 9 After a hurried three months of negotiations,
on June 20, 1997, the states and Big Tobacco announced a settlement at a
press conference that aired live on CNN.2' Later that month, the National
Association of Attorneys General and Big Tobacco jointly petitioned Con-
gress for a global resolution of the state lawsuits, which included a bar to
"suits by persons claiming injury or damage caused by conduct taking place
prior to" the agreement 2 , a $368.5 billion payment to the states, and federal
legislation that imposed strict regulatory restrictions on the tobacco indus-
try. Congress, however, rejected the proposed settlement, instead opting
for legislation that "would require [Big Tobacco] to pay more money and
accept greater regulatory and marketing restrictions than they had [initially]
agreed. '23 Big Tobacco opted out of further negotiations.24
In 1998, Mississippi, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota settled their suits
against Big Tobacco, recovering over $35 billion without an act of Con-
gress.25 With trial dates looming, on November 16, 1998, a number of State
Attorneys General and Big Tobacco reached an agreement called the "Mas-
ter Settlement Agreement," which, too, did not require Congressional ap-
proval.26  Under the terms of this agreement, these states released Big To-
'7 Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2002).
IS In early 1999, a San Francisco court would return a verdict for $1.5 million in compensatory damages
and $50 million in punitive damages in favor of a former smoker with lung cancer. John Schwartz, Jury
Awards Ex-Smoker $51.5 Million, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1999, at A2. The following month, an Oregon
jury awarded $81 million, including $79.5 million in punitive damages, to the family of a lung cancer
victim. Saundra Tonfy, Record $81 Million Award in Tobacco Case, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 1999, at
A6. In 2000, a Florida jury awarded $145 billion to a class of 500,000 to 700,000 sick smokers in the
state. Michael Bradford, Punitive Tobacco Award Fought, Bus. INS., Nov. 12, 2000, http://www.busine
ssinsurance.com/article/20001112/ISSUEO1/10001681.
'" According to defense counsel, "When we told them we were willing to do away with the Marlboro
Man and Joe Camel, I thought the AGs were going to have a heart attack. They were shocked." Curri-
den, supra note 14, at 28. (quoting Phil Carlton, counsel for Big Tobacco).
20 Curriden, supra note 14, at 29.
21 PROPOSED TOBACCO INDUSTRY SETTLEMENT (1997), available at http://www.cnn.com/US/9705/toba
cco/docs/proposal.html.
22 A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 2001).
23 Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 344 (4th Cir. 2002)
24 Curriden, supra note 14, at 30. In the next eight years, not a single piece of tobacco-control legislation
would even make it to a vote.
25 Robin Miller, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and
Distribution of MSA Proceeds, 25 A.L.R. FED. 6th 435, §2 (2007).
26 Star Scientific, 278 F.3d at 344.
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bacco from all claims on past conduct based on the sale, use, and marketing
of tobacco products.2 They also released future claims arising from injury
caused by exposure to tobacco, including future claims of reimbursement of
healthcare costs associated with citizens' exposure to tobacco products.28
The MSA permitted non-settling states to participate in the settlement if
they opted in within seven days - a time limit that "offered almost no op-
portunity for public health critics to mount an effective response" and
"placed overwhelming economic and political pressure on attorneys general
to join."2 9 This resulted in all 46 states signing onto the agreement 30 - an
agreement estimated to be worth over $200 billion over twenty-five years.31
The states were getting paid, at least ostensibly, but the MSA omitted much
of the regulatory and marketing restrictions that the proposed Congressional
legislation would have imposed on Big Tobacco.3 2
II. MONEY NOT WELL SPENT
While the MSA was "primarily designated to reimburse States for the
cost of treating smoking-related illnesses," neither the MSA nor its enacting
pieces of state legislation ensured that any money recouped was actually
spent on cessation programs, anti-smoking efforts, expenses associated with
the provision of health care, or anything else remotely having any tie to
preventing or repairing the damage caused by the tobacco industry. 33  In
2007, Mark Curriden wrote:
27 Id. at 345.
28 Id.
29 ALLAN BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY PERSISTENCE OF THE
PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 431 (2007).
3 See id. ("For a state to reject billions of dollars to take a chance with a judge and juy constituted too
great a political risk for any elected official. Even those critical of the new agreement offered their con-
sent.")
"' Star Scientific, 278 F.3d at 343. For each cigarette sold anywhere in the United States, Big Tobacco
pays an MSA Escrow Agent. The payment is then allocated among the Settling States according to an
"Allocable Share" formula in the MSA. See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, No. 02-5068,
slip op. at 2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2006). For example, as of 2006, New York's allocable share was
12.760310% (one of the largest); Vermont's was 0.4111851% (one of the smallest). Id.
32 See Star Scientific, 278 F.3d at 344. The congressional proposal would have: earmarked 1/3 of all funds
to combat teenage smoking; mandated Food & Drug Administration oversight; imposed federal advertis-
ing restrictions; granted immunity from state prosecutions; eliminated punitive damages in individual
tort suits; prohibited the use of class actions, or other joinder or aggregation devices without Big Tobac-
co's consent; exempted Big Tobacco from federal antitrust laws; and called for payments to the States of
$368.5 billion over twenty-five years. A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239,
242 (3d Cir. 2001). In contrast, the MSA contains no such restrictions and provides baseline payments
of $200 billion over twenty-five years. Id.
33 State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., No. 98-CVS-14377, 2004 WL 2966013, at *1 (N.C. Supp. Dec. 23,
2004). Under the Medicaid statute, states were required to return the federal government its share of any
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Despite a commitment from the governors and legislators to use the money to
address anti-smoking and health care concerns, only pennies on the dollar have
actually gone to those causes. Instead, the money has gone to meet budget
shortfalls or to pay for tax cuts. In Virginia, some of the tobacco settlement
was used to build new seats at a NASCAR speedway, while New York used
some of its money for sprinklers and golf carts for a course near Buffalo.
Georgia renovated a hotel. Alabama funded a boot camp for young adult
males. And North Carolina actually used money to build a tobacco ware-
house. 34
Today, it appears that this type of spending was just the tip of the ice-
berg. While $200 billion,over twenty-five years, sounds like a lot of mon-
ey, for cash-strapped states with budget deficits and capital improvements
that remained unfinanced, the thought of turning unsecured annual pay-
ments into upfront infusions of cash to states was extremely attractive.35
Further, at the time, states feared if Big Tobacco faced additional tort law-
suits from individuals or the federal government, "they may face bankrupt-
cy or move overseas, leaving the states empty-handed. 36
recoveries of Medicare expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (2012). In 1999, however, the President
signed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, which waived any federal claim to tobacco
settlement monies and otherwise removed any and all restrictions on state spending. Emergency Sup-
plemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-31, 113 Stat. 103.
" Curriden, supra note 14, at 30; see also Cezary Podkul, How Wall Street Tobacco Deals Left States
With Billions in Toxic Debt, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 7, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/h
ow-wall-street-tobacco-deals-left-states-with-billions-in-toxic-debt (Mississippi Attorney General Mike
Moore stating that the "states ... made a 'sucker bet' that diverted the winnings of the fight away from
their intended purpose"). Mississippi, home of Moore, is the only state that has "used the money for its
intended purpose completely." Fitzhugh Mullan, Reagan, Clinton, Tobacco, and Children: An Interview
with C. Everett Koop, 23 HEALTH AFF. 180, 184 (2004). The recession also likely played a large part in
the state's use of this money. As explained by Walter Jones and Gerard Silvestri: "[I]n 2000, the econ-
omy began to go into recession as the 'dot.com' bubble burst, and stock markets indices dropped rapid-
ly. On September 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, DC, the econ-
omy was further dampened by declines in tourism and air travel. The economy began to pull out of the
recession in 2003, but states that had cut taxes a few years earlier found that they did not have revenues
adequate to meet major needs across all programs. Increasing taxes as a response would be politically
dangerous for politicians who had gained or held office through the promise of reduced taxes. Inevita-
bly, the temptation to treat MSA revenues as a 'cookie jar' to be tapped for budget shortfalls was irre-
sistible." Walter J. Jones & Gerard A. Silvestri, The Master Settlement Agreement and Its Impact on
Tobacco Use 10 Years Later: Lessons for Physicians About Health Policy Making, 137 CHEST 692,
694-95 (2010).
15 See, e.g., CAL. BUDGET PROJECT, BUDGET BRIEF, BORROWING AGAINST THE FUTURE: IS
SECURITIZING CALIFORNIA'S TOBACCO SETTLEMENT REVENUES THE BEST WAY TO CLOSE THE
BUDGET GAP?, (2002), available at http://www.cbp.org/pdfs/2002/020402Tobacco.pdf; JOHN KASPRAK,
CONN. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, SECURITIZATION OF TOBACCO SETTLEMENT FUNDS, 2002-
R-0736 (2002), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2002/olrdata/ph/rpt/2002-R-0736.htm.
36 KASPRAK, supra note 35. The threat of bankruptcy by one or more tobacco companies was most re-
cently raised on September 21, 2004, when the U.S. Justice Department and Big Tobacco began the trial
phase of the government's $280 billion federal racketeering lawsuit. Tim Loehrke, Big Showdown: To-
bacco Trial Begins, USA TODAY, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/2004-09-20-
tobacco x.htm# (last updated Sept. 21, 2004, 3:43 PM). In this suit, the government is suing the tobac-
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Under this logic, "since there is no guarantee that the state will actually
receive all of the projected payments, it is better to have the cash in hand
and use or invest it now."3  Known as "securitization," the financial in-
struments were structured as follows:
[S]tate and local governments sell their tobacco settlement revenue stream to a
special purpose entity (CSPE") established for the purpose of issuing bonds
backed by these funds and paying the debt service on them. The SPE is de-
signed to be legally separate and "bankruptcy remote" from the government en-
tity. This means that the credit rating for these bonds is separate from the state
or local govermnent's rating and is based on the credit worthiness of the tobac-
co industry and the structure of the financing. The government entity bears no
financial responsibility for the bonds, and the bond purchasers bear any risk
that the bonds will not be repaid. The interest paid on the bonds issued through
securitizing the tobacco settlement payments may either be subject to federal
and state income taxes or exempt from such taxes, depending on a number of
factors including the intended use of the proceeds .... After a state creates an
SPE and transfers some or all tobacco settlement payments to it, the SPE can
issue the bonds. The SPE pledges a portion of each annual settlement payment
to pay the debt service and assumes all of the risk. The remaining settlement
amount after payment of the debt service, often called the "residual," could be
used as the state chooses. It might be put into the general fund for annual ap-
propriations, or placed in another special fund for future purposes. The actual
bond structure depends on a number of factors such as: (1) the rating the state
wants for the bonds; (2) the amount of money the state wants in an up-front
payment; (3) bond proceed usage; and (4) rating agencies' requirements and
their assumptions. 38
However, what the states failed to adequately take into account in secu-
ritizing their payments, was (1) the high interest rate made the bonds expen-
sive; (2) a state would end up with only a slight fraction of the amount it
would have received over the long term; (3) securitization is an expensive
transaction, involving fees for investment bankers, brokers, accountants,
and lawyers - all of whom have their own interests in mind; (4) selling off
the revenue stream upfront would result in a state budget hole in the future;
(5) a state legislature's ability to adapt to a state's needs and priorities
would be limited; (6) if future payments were insufficient to cover the
bonds issued by the third party, a state could face pressure, both politically
and legally, to back the bonds39; (7) there might be a loss of market share to
co companies to recover the companies' "ill-gotten gains" under the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d
1, 32 (D.D.C. 2006).
7 KASPRAK, supra note 35.
38 KASPRAK, supra note 35.
9 KASPRAK, supra note 35.
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nonparticipating manufacturers40 ; and (8) as discussed in more detail below,
if there was a threat of insufficient future payments, a state might be forced
to concede to Big Tobacco's demands in regard to diligent enforcement of
the "qualifying statute" required by the MSA.41
Since 1999, 19 states (and certain counties in New York and Califor-
nia)42 have securitized their share of MSA payments,43 resulting in billions
of dollars in toxic debt - $64 billion on just $3 billion advanced, to be pre-
cise. 4 The debt became "toxic" because of the same miscalculation that led
to the housing bubble of 2007:45 a decline in tobacco consumption above
what was estimated, and outdated calculations on loss of market share to
nonparticipating manufacturers - i.e. any non-Big Tobacco manufacturers,
including tribal manufacturers.46 As to the former, the drop of roughly 3.5
percent in Big Tobacco consumption realized in the past twenty years is
nearly double that projected by the securitization agreements.4 As to the
latter, states have now been forced by the MSA with a Hobson's Choice:
protect Big Tobacco's market share by enacting laws that attack otherwise
legal enterprises; or face losing billions of dollars. 48 Despite attempts to
shield SPE's from affecting states' revenue stream, the debt will not simply
disappear. In the event of default, bondholders will still be responsible to
taxpayers for subsequent tobacco income on bonds that will continue to
earn an estimated $1.6 billion in interest.49 Additionally, the adverse credit
rating for SPEs will be assigned to states, and this will dissuade bondhold-
40 CAL. DEBT & INv. ADVISORY COMM'N, ISSUE BRIEF, TOBACCO SECURITIZATION: BOND ISSUANCE IN
CALIFORNIA 8 (2008), available at http://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cdiac/reports/tobacco.pdf.
41 Star Scientific v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 346 (4th Cir. 2002). California State Treasurer Bill Lockyer
has likened securitization to "payday loans, with their delayed payments, astronomical interest rates and
catastrophic balloon payments." Ken Broder, California Helps Wall Street Pocket 44% of Landmark
Tobacco Settlement, ALLGOV CALIFORNIA (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.allgov.co/usa/ca/news/where-
is-the-money-going/california-helps-wall-street-pocket-44-of-landmark-tobacco-settlement- 140919?new
s=854296.
42 See Cezary Podkul & Claire Kelloway, Investors Haul in Nearly Half the Tobacco Settlement Cash,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 11, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/investors-haul-in-nearly-
half-the-tobacco-settlement-cash ("California and New York are unique in that, unlike the other states
party to the settlement, they share their settlement proceeds with county governments and some cities.").
4' GLEN ANDERSON & CATHRYN STEEVES, NUvEEN INv., TOBACCO BONDS: CAREFUL CREDIT
ANALYSIS IS THE KEY 1 (Jul. 2014), available at http://www.nuveen.com/Home/Documents/Viewer.asp
x?fileld=63396.
44 Podkul, supra note 34.
45 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE DESCENT
INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (discussing the housing bubble of 2007).
46 See Podkul, supra note 34.
41 Podkul, supra note 34; see ANDERSON & STEEVES, supra note 43.
48 "Certain new technologies, such as electronic cigarettes ("e-cigs"), nicotine patches or smoking cessa-
tion drugs also pose a risk to consumption." ANDERSON & STEEVES, supra note 43.
41 Podkul, supra note 34.
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ers from investing in traditional bonds,50 causing what has been described
by California State Treasurer Bill Lockyer as a widespread "negative fallout
in the market" of government bonds.51
In a July 2012 report, Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") found that
the volume adjustment component of MSA - the provision meant to pro-
tect Big Tobacco's market share (discussed in more detail below) - will
result in 74 percent of the aggregate outstanding balance of all the tobacco
settlement bonds going into default.52 By May of 2014, that number had
risen to 80 percent. 53 In other words, not only will there be no "residual"
for states, but 80 percent of the states' SPEs will fail. In order to avoid an
inevitable crash in bond ratings, some states, such as California, are restruc-
turing their tobacco bonds to include an "appropriation pledge" that will in-
fuse its general budget with monies to pay the bonds back when tobacco
revenues are insufficient.54  Thus, states, while technically receiving mil-
lions of dollars from Big Tobacco, will actually be paying those millions
and more to bondholders, resulting in an overall net loss of billions of dol-
lars. In this situation Wall Street, not the states, will be the beneficiary.
Whether the current state of affairs is due to another modern Wall Street
swindle, 55 Big Tobacco's continuing heist of state interests, state fiscal mal-
practice,56 or a combination thereof, the outlook is not good for the public
treasury.
III. BIG TOBACCO FORCES STATES TO ATTACK TRIBES
In 2011, I published a three-part series for the Native American Times,
warning Indian Country of the threat posed by the MSA. At the time,
5 Podkul, supra note 34.
5' Broder, supra note 41.
52 Matt Wirz, Tobacco Bonds Could Go Up in Smoke, Moody's Says, WALL ST. J., Jul. 12,
2012, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/07/12/tobacco-bonds-could-go-up-in-smoke-moodys-says.
5 Podkul, supra note 34.
5 Mike Cherney, California Tobacco Bond Sale a Hit with Investors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424127887324020504578399012544703592.
55 See Podkul, supra note 34 ("Investment bankers from Citigroup, the now defunct Bear Steams and
others who, along with consultants and lawyers, have pocketed more than $500 million in fees for their
financial engineering .... They now stand to make more as the governments look to rework old deals
and try to get even more tobacco cash upfront.").
56 See Appellee's Brief at 24, Kentucky v. Alliance Tobacco Corp., No. 03-11030, 2004 WL 2055866
(W.D. Ky. 2004) (arguing that "[s]elling off 25 years of tobacco settlement payments to close a hole in a
single year's budget is fiscal malpractice").
5' Ryan Dreveskracht, Cigarette Tax: Not About Money?, NATIVE AM. TIMES, Jul. 1, 2011, available at
2011 WLNR 14764796; Ryan Dreveskracht, Part II: Cigarette Tax - Still Not About Money, NATIVE
AM. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 16743828; Ryan Dreveskracht, Part III: Cigarette
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states like New York were coming down hard on tribal governments that
refused to collect state taxes on Indian tobacco, 58 even though the state
would collect much more money if they collected their own "use taxes,"
which equally applied and did not affront tribal sovereignty by treating trib-
al governments as mere state tax collectors 9.5  Recognizing that states' wag-
ing these zero-sum battles against their neighboring sovereigns made no
economic sense, and considering that states have absolutely no authority to
enforce any judgment against tribal governments or peoples,60 I posed the
question: what "prompted [states] to turn a blind eye to compacting - a
tried and true source of problem-free revenue?1 61
The answer: the MSA. Big Tobacco was concerned that it would lose
money - which is the usual position of a non-prevailing party in a multi-
billion-dollar civil suit. However, rather than take the hit, Big Tobacco
immediately raised its cigarette prices to "cover the future costs of the
MSA. 62 Naturally, the concern was that price increases would create a
competitive disadvantage when compared to nonparticipating manufactur-
ers - tobacco manufacturers that had done no wrong (or had not yet even
come into existence).63
Big Tobacco originally inserted provisions into the MSA that protect its
market shares and profitability. 64 Specifically, the MSA allows Big Tobac-
co to reduce their damage payments if they "lose market share during a giv-
en year," as determined by a group of economic consultants designated un-
der procedures established in the MSA.65 In addition, the MSA required
that states enact a statute, drafted by Big Tobacco,66 mandating that every
nonparticipating manufacturer either (1) join the MSA and its state payment
Tax - Okay, Maybe it is About Money, NATIVE AM. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
17869966.
58 See, e.g., Oneida Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 645 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).
5' Dreveskracht, Cigarette Tax: Not About Money?, supra note 57.
61 Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi, 498 U.S. 505, 507 (1991).
61 Dreveskracht, Part III: Cigarette Tax - Okay, Maybe it is About Money, supra note 57.
62 State v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 618 S.E.2d 219, 221 (N.C. 2005).
63 Star Scientific, Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2002).
64 Id. at 345-46.
65 Id. at 346. Participating manufacturers do not make these payments to individual States. Instead,
each manufacturer makes a single, nationwide payment in the overall amount calculated and determined
by the Independent Auditor. The Independent Auditor then allocates those nationwide payments among
the States by applying pre-set "Allocable Share" percentages previously negotiated by the states. State v.
Philip Morris USA, Inc., 927 A.2d 503, 506 (N.H. 2007).
66 See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, No. 02 Civ.5068 (JFK), 2006 WL 1517603, at *2
(S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2006) (noting that the "MSA's participating manufacturers played a key role in
drafting the Allocable Share Amendments," and that the "Settling States made sure that they had the
manufacturers' 'blessing' before the legislation could be considered safe for enactment").
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program, or (2) pay into an escrow account in an amount determined by
each manufacturer's sales volume in the state - an amount roughly equal
to what Big Tobacco would pay under the MSA.6
"If a State does not enact and diligently enforce a qualifying statute, it
can lose future payments."68 In order to ensure that they complied with Big
Tobacco's demands, after enactment of the Escrow Statutes, states passed
"Contraband Statutes" that require nonparticipating manufacturers to annu-
ally certify to the state attorney general that they are either (1) signed onto
the MSA, or are (2) making escrow deposits. 69 Each statute penalizes non-
compliance by denying state tax stamps and rendering the tobacco "contra-
band," thereby prohibiting the sale of cigarettes in that state by the nonpar-
ticipating manufacturer. In other words, the state tax stamps are not only
about tax, but serve also - and most importantly - as indicia of compli-
ance with the state's MSA scheme. This forces smaller or independent to-
bacco companies to pay for Big Tobacco's mistakes. Quite literally - and
despite grandstanding by state officials who tritely claim that nonparticipat-
ing manufacturers "must pay their fair share" of state taxes 7 1 - unless these
businesses opt into the MSA, they cannot pay state taxes, no matter how
hard they try. 2
What about those businesses that do not pay state taxes at all? What
about tobacco businesses that operate wholly in Indian Country or are oper-
ated by nontaxable sovereign tribal entities and are not subject to state Es-
67 Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2005). Unlike Big Tobacco,
which pays outright into the settlement fund, nonparticipating manufacturers retain title to the escrowed
funds, and interest, for twenty-five years - at which point the funds will be released to the nonpartici-
pating manufacturer. Id.
68 Star Scientific, 278 F.3d at 346.
69 Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd., 425 F.3d at 164.
0 Id.
71 Kenneth Lovett, Gov. Cuomo Enforces Taxes on Cigarette Sales, Seizes $1.2M From Indian Tribes
Who Flaunt Laws, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jul. 16, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/gov-cuomo-enforces-taxes-cigarette-sales-seizes--2m-indian-tribes-flaunt-laws-article-1.161070.
72 See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. King, No. 02-5068, 2008 WL 4615838, at *1 (S.D. N.Y.
Oct. 14, 2008) ("[S]tates also enacted 'Contraband Statutes,' which deny manufacturers that do not
comply with the Escrow Statutes a tax stamp, essentially prohibiting the sale of their cigarettes."); Grand
River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, No. 02-5068, 2003 WL 22232974, at *3 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 29,
2003) ("The Certification Statute is a companion to the Escrow Statute and prohibits the sale of ciga-
rettes in a state (by denying the manufacturers a [tax] stamp - the equivalent of a license) by companies
that fail to comply with the Escrow Statute."). Ironically, nonparticipating manufacturers' escrow pay-
ments are taxed, while MSA payments made by Big Tobacco are tax deductible. Freedom Holdings,
Inc. v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).
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crow Statutes?"3 What about the third sovereigns?"4 What about govern-
ments that, before the MSA, formed reciprocal relationships with states to
realize mutual revenues from tobacco sales?" None of that matters. Their
interests are ignored. Regardless of whether tribal entities are legally im-
mune from state law, they are competing participants in the tobacco market,
who are taking business from Big Tobacco. Unless states "diligently en-
force" their Contraband Statutes - which in the eyes of Big Tobacco
means going after all manufacturers, regardless of the legality of their oper-
ations" - they will lose their money." Money that is, as discussed above,
already spent. At this point, states simply can ill afford not to bow to Big
Tobacco's demands. To do so would be to risk certain financial ruin.
For at least six states, the threat of defaulting on their MSA settlement
bonds is a rather harsh reality. In 2012, Big Tobacco withheld payments to
fifteen states (Colorado, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania), claiming that these states did not "diligently
enforce" their Contraband Statutes."S An arbitration panel ruled in Septem-
ber of 2013 that six states (Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania) will receive approximately $500 million less in
MSA payments from tobacco manufacturers than expected, and will also be
subjected to a 50 to 60 percent reduction in 2014 MSA payments."v
" See Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd., 2006 WL 1517603, at *2 ("[C]igarettes sold on Native
American reservations are exempt from escrow payments.... On Native American reservations, packs
typically are sold without state excise tax stamps.").
"4 See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Resisting Federal Courts on Tribal Jurisdiction, 81 U. COLO. L. REV.
973, 1021 (2010) (noting tribes' "rightful place as the third sovereign"); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Same-
Sex Marriage, Indian Tribes, and the Constitution, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 53, 56 (2006) (noting that Indi-
an tribes should be introduced "into the Federal Union as the third sovereign"); Samantha A. Moppett,
Acknowledging America's First Sovereign, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 267, 335 (2010) (noting the "ex-
istence of Indian tribes a[s] th[e] third sovereign entity in the United States").
15 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.466 (Yakama Nation cigarette tax agreement); TOBACCO TAX
COMPACT BETWEEN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA AND THE KAW NATION (2013); see generally Matthew
L.M. Fletcher, The Power to Tax, the Power to Destroy, and the Michigan Tribal-State Tax Agreements,
82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (2005) (discussing tribal-state tax agreements generally).
76 See e.g. State v. Philip Morris Inc., 61 A.D.3d 575, 577 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009) (New York State argu-
ing that that under state law "cigarettes sold on tribal lands within the State are exempt from taxation"
and "[b]ecause of both the manner in which 'units sold' is calculated and the State's policy regarding
cigarettes sold on tribal lands, [nonparticipating manufacturers] who sell cigarettes on tribal lands are
not required to make annual escrow deposits.").
" As argued by Big Tobacco apologists, nonenforcement of the states' escrow statutes on Indian lands
would "render the MSA's diligent enforcement requirement meaningless - a result clearly not bar-
gained for, contemplated, or intended by the parties." Haile & Krueger-Andes, supra note 2, at 169.
78 Brian M. Haynes & Anne Hampton Andrews, Disputed 2003 MSA Payments Resolved, SMOKE SHOP,
Dec. 2013, at 44.
79 id.
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Further, the arbitration ruling only applied to states fulfilling require-
ments in 2003, while the question of whether some states "diligently en-
forced" their Contraband Statutes from 2003 to 2014 is still in dispute.80 In
2012, a group of 19 states secretly negotiated a settlement of the MSA's
nonparticipating manufacturer adjustment ("NPM Adjustment") - a provi-
sion that provides for a potential reduction in Big Tobacco's annual pay-
ments to the states if there is an "aggregate market share loss" to nonpartic-
ipating manufacturers81 - for years 2003-2014.82 The settlement reduced
the NPM Adjustment penalty for those years in return for (1) "credits
against the participating states' portion of MSA payments,"83 and (2) a sig-
nificant expansion of the scope of state enforcement obligations "beyond
the terms of the MSA.' Specifically, with expansion of enforcement, the
states are required to compel escrow deposits for all tobacco sales made in
the state, "regardless of whether those sales were subject to state excise tax
or tax-exempt" - i.e. to specifically target "tribal sales," the enforcement
of which will indisputably violate federal law.85 A number of non-settling
states have opposed the settlement, however. In August 2013, motions to
invalidate the settlement were filed in at least 13 state courts.8 6 As of now,
no state has received a ruling that is adverse to the settlement, but appeals
are in process.8 This dispute will be discussed in greater detail below.
" See Press Release, Philip Morris USA, Philip Morris USA and Other Manufacturers Prevail in Dec-
ade-Long Settlement Payment Dispute (Sept. 11, 2013), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news
/home/20130911006374/en/Philip-Morris-USA-Manufacturers-Prevail-Decade-Long-
Settlement#.VD1HK9R4rns (noting that "[s]tates that did not join the December 2012 settlement still
face NPM adjustment disputes for years 2004 through 2012" and that Big Tobacco is "fully prepared to
move forward with the arbitration for the 2004 dispute, and for all of the remaining years as well.").
"I Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2005).
82 ARiz. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., PROGRAM SUMMARY: MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 2
(2014), available at http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/psattmsa.pdf; N.M. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN.,
SUMMARY OF THE TOBACCO MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 8 (2013), available at http://www.nml
egis.gov/lcs/handouts/TSROC%2006112013%20Item%203%20Summary%20of%20the%20Tobacco%
20Master%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf.
83 ARiz. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 2.
84 N.M. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 8.
85 N.M. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 8. The settlement would require that states
require escrow on all sales that it "reasonably could have known about." Although this term is not de-
fined, "it at least suggests that cigarette sales need not be reported to be subject to escrow." N.M. OFFICE
OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 8.
86 ARiz. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 2.
87 ARiz. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 82, at 2.
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VI. BIG TOBACCO FORCES THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO ATTACK
TRIBES
It is not just the states that have been forced into doing Big Tobacco's
dirty work.88 Although "[f]ederal and state governments lack authority to
tax cigarettes sold to members of Native American tribes" and, "[t]hus, cig-
arettes to be consumed on the reservation by enrolled tribal members are
tax-exempt" and need not bear stamps,89 Big Tobacco has lobbied Congress
to enact federal statutes, such as the Smuggled Tobacco Prevention
("STOP") Act.90 The STOP Act would require that tribal manufacturers
comply with state Contraband Statutes.91 These efforts have already caused
confusion on the part of federal enforcement agencies, such as the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives ("ATF"), who mistakenly
believe that tribes are committing "MSA fraud" by failing to remit state es-
crow payments.92 On the other hand, ATF's "confusion" is equally likely to
have stemmed from its purposefully "exceed[ing its] statutory authority" in
order to divert millions of dollars of cash and proceeds into ATF agents'
personal accounts. 93 According to a recent U.S. Department of Justice au-
dit, ATF officials have used the excuse that "some Native American tribes
and reservations" are "sell[ing] cigarettes without paying the requisite ...
state excise taxes" in order to conduct illicit undercover operations, a single
one of which resulted in roughly $15 million in cash and proceeds being
heisted by local ATF offices and so-called "confidential informants." 94
In November of 2014, in yet another attempt to force federal agencies to
attack nonparticipating manufacturers, Big Tobacco filed what, at first
blush, appears to be a peculiar lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agri-
88 See Doug Rendleman, A Cap on the Defendant's Appeal Bond?: Punitive Damages Tort Reform, 39
AKRON L. REV. 1089, 1130 (2006) ("[T]he MSA converted the state governments into business partners
with their former adversaries, the tobacco companies.").
89 City of New York v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 550 F. Supp. 2d 332, 337 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
o H.R. 2990, 113th Cong. (2013).
9' See Why Indian Country Must Stop the STOP Act, NAT'L TOBACCO TRADE ASS'N, http://www.ncai.or
g/initiatives/partnerships-initiatives/ncai-tax-initiative/Why Indian Country Must Stop the STOP Ac
t.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
92 Jeff Cohen, Current ATF Cigarette Diversion Initiatives, http://www.taxadmin.org/fta/meet/09 tobacc
o/papers/Diversion.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2015).
" OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. - AUDIT DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT 13-36,
AUDIT OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, AND EXPLOSIVES' USE OF INCOME-
GENERATING, UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS ii (2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/201
3/a1336.pdf.
14 Id. at 2, 14-15.
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culture ("USDA").15 The suit seeks a roughly $400,000 reduction in pay-
ments owed to the USDA based on USDA's alleged failure to account for
unreported cigarette production and sales in calculating Big Tobacco's
market share under the Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act of 2004
("FETRA"),96 a statute that directs the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture to offer
tobacco farmers annual payments, paid by tobacco manufacturers in an
amount equal to their "pro rata share of total gross domestic [tobacco] vol-
ume.97
According to Big Tobacco, the offset is warranted because USDA has
"failed to account for ... non-reporting, unlicensed Native American ciga-
rette manufacturers" who sell "a substantial portion of th[eir] cigarettes to
non-Native Americans." 98 The lawsuit is peculiar because, like the states'
attack on tribes via their Contraband Statutes, even if Big Tobacco's allega-
tions were true, the lawsuit makes no economic sense. Protracted litigation
will surely ensue, racking up attorneys' fees that will far outstrip the mere
$400,000 reduction sought. With annual profits of $90 billion a year,99 the
lawsuit is a drop in the bucket - hardly something worth ruining an affable
relationship with the Secretary of Agriculture over. That is, until the MSA
comes into the picture.
In order to understand how the MSA is involved, we must address the
enactment of the FETRA. Since 1938, United States tobacco farmers had
been the beneficiaries of a federal market stabilization/price support pro-
gram that utilized marketing "quotas.' 0 0  Under this system, the USDA set
the amount of tobacco a producer could sell during a given season and the
price at which he could sell it and tied to very specific property that only
" See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Dep't of
Agric., No. 14-1388 (D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2014) (hereinafter "USDA Complaint").
96 7 U.S.C. §§ 518-518f (2012).
9' § 518d(i)(4)(B); State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 618 S.E.2d 219, 223 (N.C. 2005).
98 USDA Complaint, supra note 95, at 4.
99 Paul M. Barrett, Why Big Tobacco Shrugs at a $24 Billion Verdict, BLOOMBERGBUS. (July 20, 2014),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-20/reynolds-americans-24-billion-verdict-in-florida-doe
snt-matter.
'0o See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1311-16 (2000) (repealed 2004) (providing overview of statutory quota system);
Cole v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 33 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (lth Cir. 1994) (providing an overview of the
statutory and regulatory framework). As explained by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Philip Morris USA, "In 1938 the federal government began implementing price supports and marketing
quotas for U.S. tobacco in an effort to stabilize the domestic tobacco market. Quotas limited production
and confined the cultivation of tobacco to specific tracts of land. While the federal government adjusted
quota levels annually based on tobacco companies' demand, federal price supports kept tobacco prices
elevated. 618 S.E.2d 219, 220 (N.C. 2005); see also Raysor, supra note 12, at 514-25 (discussing in
detail federal involvement in the tobacco market).
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existed in specific jurisdictions in specific states.10 1 The only way a pro-
ducer of tobacco could sell his product was to own or lease "quota."'01 2 This
limited tobacco production to these specific jurisdictions and specific
states. 0 3 Over time, many quotas fell into beneficiaries who did not use
them, resulting in over 300,000 absentee quota holders."° Because of the
limited access to quota, a large amount of the cost of producing tobacco
came from leasing quota which has been described as "a wholly artificial
cost created by the federal statutory scheme. 1 0 5 In the early 1990s, the in-
flated cost of American tobacco under this system was high enough that it
became cheaper to import tobacco from countries in Africa and South
America.0 6 Tobacco imports rose even atop of huge reductions in quota
prices 0 ' and a 350 percent tariff on tobacco imports.' °8 Between 1981 and
1997, domestic tobacco output declined by roughly 20 percent and was es-
timated to continue to decline exponentially.0 9 By the end of 1997, there
was "little doubt that the small tobacco farmer was ... struggling and per-
haps is on the verge of extinction" due to the quota system. 1 Although
'.' State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 98-CVS-14377, 2004 WL 2966013, at *4 (N.C. Super. Dec. 23,
2004). Tobacco farmers were not unique in this respect. The Nation's most prominently grown crops
are subject to a government-imposed quota system. See e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1330 (2000) (corn); §§
1331-1340 (wheat); §§ 1341-1350 (cotton); §§ 1351-1356 (rice); §§ 1357-1359a (peanuts).
102 A penalty was specified in 7 U.S.C. § 1314(a) for the marketing of tobacco in excess of a producer's
allotment. 7 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2000). Producers who resell excess-quota tobacco also were subject to a
penalty. 7 C.F.R. § 723.410(g) (2005). "The [quota] program was very data intensive, requiring USDA's
Farm Service Agency (FSA) to maintain detailed annual records of every tobacco farmer who owned or
leased tobacco quota, including the exact location of the quota. The program also yielded rich market
price data since tobacco was historically sold via government-sanctioned tobacco auctions. Prices were
closely tied to the government-set minimum support prices guaranteed under the federal tobacco pro-
gram. No tobacco could be legally sold in the U.S. without providing a significant amount of farm-level
production and marketing data to the government agency administering the tobacco program." Kelly J.
Tiller & LaKeya N. Jones, Post-Buyout Burley Tobacco Production and Trends in the Traditional Bur-
ley Regions of Tennessee, North Carolina and Virginia 3 (S. Agric. Econ. Ass'n, Working Paper No.
34987, 2007), available at http://ageconsearch.unm.edu/bitstream/34987/1/sp07ti04.pdf.
103 Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 WL 2966013, at *4.
104Id.
105 Id.
106 Seyward Darby, Governmental Buyout Terminates Tobacco Quotas, CHRONICLE (Oct. 12, 2004),
http://www.dukechronicle.com/articles/2004/10/13/governmental-buyout-terminates-tobacco-quotas;
see also Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 WL 2966013, at *7 ("Foreign competition was taking huge
chunks out of the domestic market. The tobacco support system made U.S. tobacco uncompetitive on
the international market from a price standpoint ... ").
'o See generally Blake A. Brown & Laura L. Martin, Price Versus Quota Reductions: U.S. Flue-Cured
Tobacco Policy, 28 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 445 (1996), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bi
tstream/15112/1/28020445.pdf (discussing policy of "reducing quota to maintain price versus a policy of
allowing price to fall to maintain quota.").
10 DAVID SKULLY, U.S. TARIFF RATE QUOTAS AND AGOA MARKET ACCESS 4 (2010), available at hap
://www.agritrade.org/Publications/documents/USTRQsandAGOApolicyfocus full.pdf.
10' Tobacco country fights back, ECONOMIST (Mar. 19, 1998), http://www.economist.com/node/158071.
110 Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 WL 2966013, at *4-7.
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talk of putting the quota system to an end had been gaining steam since the
early 1990s,"' legislation was formally introduced to put it to an end in
1997.112
Then, in 1998 - in the midst of utter turmoil for tobacco farmers -
came the MSA, which would have sounded the death knell had it not been
for "Attorneys General from tobacco-producing states strongly advocating
that some MSA payments go toward agricultural funding and rural econom-
ic development."1 13 As explained by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
State v. Philip Morris USA,114
[Big Tobacco] immediately raised prices to cover the future costs of payments
due under the MSA. The parties anticipated this rise in prices would curtail to-
bacco consumption; indeed, reduced consumption was one of the aims of the
MSA. They also understood decreased demand for tobacco products could
cause tobacco [farmers] significant economic hardship. The MSA therefore re-
quired that [Big Tobacco] meet with the political leadership of the fourteen to-
bacco growing states .. to devise a plan for mitigating the MSA's potentially
negative economic consequences. These meetings produced the National To-
bacco Grower Settlement Trust [whereby Big Tobacco] pledged to spend ap-
proximately $5.15 billion on economic assistance to tobacco farmers .... [Big
Tobacco] agreed to the Trust because doing so was a condition of the settle-
ment that had relieved them of potentially bankrupting liability for smoking-
related healthcare costs. Additionally, the Trust shields [Big Tobacco] from
claims the [growers] might otherwise bring for economic damages suffered as a
result of the MSA.1 15
Essentially, the "Phase II" MSA payments were meant to ease tobacco
farmers' worries, "as they would be given time to diversify their crop to in-
clude other commodities separate from tobacco, or to allow the quota hold-
ers to cease planting tobacco altogether."116 To calculate exactly how much
Big Tobacco was to pay under this Phase II of the MSA, the assessment for
a given calendar year would be determined by taking the specified base
payment for that year and applying a "Volume Adjustment," which either
... See Cecil H. Yancy, Jr., Timing Was Right for Tobacco Buyout, SE. FARM PRESS (Jan. 5, 2005), http:/
/southeastfarmpress.com/timing-was-right-tobacco-buyout.
112 Universal Tobacco Settlement Act, S. 1415, 105th Cong. § 821 (1997).
... DANIEL J. ROSENBAUM, RICHARD L. BARNES & STANTON A. GLANTz, A FEW MORE LAPS To Go:
TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL INFLUENCE, PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY AND TOBACCO CONTROL
POLICY MAKING IN INDIANA 1893-2011, CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDUC. 97-98 (June
2011).
... State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 618 S.E.2d 219 (N.C. 2005).
"5 Id. at 221 (footnotes omitted).
116 Raysor, supra note 12, at 529-30.
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increased or decreased the Big Tobacco's payment, depending on the num-
ber of cigarettes shipped during the preceding calendar year. 11
The deal, however, was not the boon expected by tobacco farmers. Dur-
ing the first three years of the Phase II agreement, a total of about $1 billion
was distributed to the 14 participating states. 8 This total was about $71
million less than estimated and "primarily attributable to adjustments made
to trust payments as a result of a decrease in the volume of cigarettes
shipped" by Big Tobacco. 9 Another adjustment to payments was the "Tax
Offset Adjustment. 1 2  Apparently, "[t]he parties drafted [Phase II] know-
ing federal and state governments might take additional measures to aid to-
bacco farmers" and that these "measures would probably entail additional
assessments" against Big Tobacco. 12  The Tax Offset Adjustment entitled
Big Tobacco to reduce its annual payment in response to the imposition of a
"Governmental Obligation," defined as "a new or increased" obligation to
pay monies "used in whole or in part for the benefit of tobacco farmers. '"2
Meaning, essentially, that if Big Tobacco was required by law to pay any
more than the amount it agreed to pay under Phase II, Phase II payments
and all of the benefit that the tobacco farmers were supposed to receive
from the MSA would disappear in lieu of a new benefit conferred by state
or federal legislation.
As it turns out, Big Tobacco had no intent of paying out under Phase II.
From 1998 on, Big Tobacco ramped up its lobbying efforts to pass buyout
legislation similar to the 1997 bill, in order "to extricate themselves from
the Trust obligations. 1 23 Their efforts came to fruition in 2004, an election
year. 1 24 Surreptitiously tucked into Title VI of the American Jobs Creation
Act of 2004 was the FETRA 125  _ the first law to move an American crop
"instantaneously from a government-regulated market to a free-market sys-
"7 Philip Morris USA Inc., 618 S.E.2d at 222.
18 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT No. GAO-03-262R: STATES' ALLOCATIONS OF PHASE II
FUNDS 6 (2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/91635.pdf.
119Id.
120 Philip Morris USA Inc., 618 S.E.2d at 222.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 State v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 98-CVS-14377, 2004 WL 2966013, at *8 (N.C. Super. Dec. 23,
2004).
4 Id. "The leverage provided by pending close elections on the state and national levels in 2004 pro-
vided the best timing for a buyout for tobacco farmers and the tobacco industry." Id. at *5; see also id.
at *12 ("The opportunity for passage of a bill of this nature was in all probability rare and unique. The
Tobacco Companies and the growers seized that opportunity .... ).
125 American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418, 1521-36.
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tem. ' 12 6 The Senate bill passed on July 15, 2004, and provided that the fed-
eral government would buyout all quota, with payments funded by assess-
ments levied on Big Tobacco.12 After Senate and House conferences, on
October 11, 2004, an agreed-upon bill was passed, providing quota holders
$7 per quota pound ($1 less than the Senate bill), paid in equal installments
over 10 years, with total payments not to exceed $10.14 billion ($1.86 bil-
lion less than the Senate bill). 28 In addition, and most importantly, the final
bill1 29 provided that the buyout would be funded by assessments on all to-
bacco product manufacturers and importers, not just those of Big Tobacco,
based upon their market share. 30 Because of the Tax Offset Adjustment,
Phase II payments disappeared. 31
At the same time, FETRA inflicted harm upon tobacco farmers - the
supposed beneficiary - because it mandated a forced sale of tobacco quota
at a below-market price. 3 2  Thus, as with most forced sales, 33 although
126 Matthew N. Leerberg, Takings and Statutory Entitlements: Does the Tobacco Buyout Take Quota
Rights Without Just Compensation?, 55 DUKE L.J. 865, 866 (2006).
127 Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 WL 2966013, at *10. The Senate bill also restricted where tobacco
could be grown, the amount produced, and included FDA regulation and set aside funds to support the
development in communities that previously heavily relied upon the revenue generated from the produc-
tion of quota tobacco. The final bill excluded all of this. Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. at *11 ("On October 21, 2004, the bill as stated in the conference agreement was presented to
President Bush. The President signed the bill the next day.")
13' Id. The FETRA contains a two-step process for the USDA to determine quarterly assessments owed
by tobacco product manufacturers and importers. First, assessments are allocated among six classes of
tobacco products: (1) cigarettes; (2) cigars; (3) snuff; (4) chewing tobacco; (5) pipe tobacco; and (6) roll-
your-own tobacco. Next, the assessments are allocated on a pro-rata basis among the manufacturers and
importers within each of the six classes of tobacco products. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Vilsack, 736
F.3d 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2013).
'' Philip Morris USA Inc., 2004 WL 2966013, at *3, *12 ("It is abundantly clear that Congress was
keenly aware of the impact of FETRA on the Phase II payments.").
132 See Leerberg, supra note 126, at 872 ("The Buyout Payments are 'offered' to the tobacco quota hold-
ers. Although this might imply that quota holders have an option to reject the Buyout Payments, there-
by obviating a takings claim by giving a quota holder a choice, FETRA negates the value of the quota
rights regardless of whether the 'offer' is accepted."). As eloquently described by the Court in Philip
Morris USA Inc.: "With FETRA the tobacco manufactures achieved a goal critical to their survival - a
means to control the price of their most expensive cost component, leaf. The bill dismantles the price
support system that drove up costs and gives the manufacturers the ability to control their own destiny
by contract pricing and purchase of foreign tobacco. With cost control, they have the possibility of
keeping prices at a level that will not diminish consumption. They accomplished that without the bur-
den of FDA regulation which might have further reduced consumption. Of course, between now and
2014 they will have to pay for the benefit they received. The bill is about 8.3 billion dollars. That figure
is on top of amounts already paid under the Phase II Trust. While the amount seems large on its face,
the cost may not be nearly that high. The Tobacco Companies will have three ways to pay the bill.
First, they are relieved of future payments under Phase II in the amount of $2.7 billion. Those were part
of the future costs built into the 1998 price increase. Second, they can decrease prices for leaf and in-
crease wholesale prices. That process has begun already. The Tobacco Companies can save enormous
sums and can easily reduce leaf prices by at least the amount that represents (a) the costs savings to non-
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FETRA at least partially compensated quota holders for their rights to grow
tobacco, it also represented "a sudden shift to financial independence for
those ... persons [who] rel[ied] on the stream of income from leasing the
quota right to tobacco farmers." '134 The economics of the FETRA have been
aptly described by Craig Raysor as follows:
[A]ssessments are to be collected quarterly over the ten year period beginning
with the 2005 fiscal year, which the yearly amount would equal out to about
one billion dollars. The assessments are apportioned to gross domestic volume
share of the market held by each class of tobacco product. The amount to be
paid by the cigarette manufacturer could be roughly $0.05 per pack if the mar-
ket share remains similar for cigarettes to the 2004 market year. .... The unfor-
tunate aspect is that these numbers are not as high per farmer as the payout
from the manufacturers suggest. The top one percent of recipients will receive
a fourth of the payments, equaling about $600,000 average over the ten years,
while the bottom eighty percent will receive about $5,000 over the ten year pe-
riod. 3 5
Adding insult to injury, after the buyout Big Tobacco - who hold a vir-
tual monopoly on the industry - began purchasing tobacco through direct
contracts, which "gave preference to larger, consolidated farms, and which
quota holding farmers who had to pay for quota or (b) the amount quota holding farmers will receive
under FETRA in lieu of their previous quota. While FETRA is in effect, this will be a break-even prop-
osition for the farmers and the Tobacco Companies if the price is only reduced by the amount of the
quota being replaced with buyout payments. The Tobacco Companies expenditures are the same
amount, they just go to different places. Farmers receive the same total income when leaf price and
buyout payments are combined as they did before. When FETRA payments are over, the cost savings
will drop to the bottom line for the Tobacco Companies. If the reduction in the price of U.S. tobacco is
greater than the amount required to fund the buyout, the Tobacco Companies will have even more mon-
ey to pay for the buyout. If the drop in the price of U.S. grown tobacco causes a price drop in the inter-
national market or more of the cheaper foreign tobacco is purchased, the Tobacco Companies may re-
ceive an immediate cost reduction that drops to the bottom line. Since all U.S. tobacco will be sold on
contract, the Tobacco Companies are in a better position to set price.... On the distribution side, To-
bacco Companies may take more of the share of consumer dollars from retailers and wholesalers or pass
some cost increase along to smokers. Phillip Morris and Reynolds have already announced reductions
in retailer discounts and some price increases. Thus, Tobacco Companies are in a position to pass buy-
out costs down to leaf producers and up to retailers, thus increasing the percentage of the consumer dol-
lar spent on tobacco retained by the manufacturers. That has been a trend in the industry.... The eco-
nomic impact of [FETRA] makes it hard to believe that the bottom line of the Tobacco Companies will
be adversely affected by the buyout. It may be benefited." 2004 WL 2966013, at *22-23 (emphasis add-
ed).
'33 See generally Holly YoungBear-Tibbetts, Without Due Process: The Alienation of Individual Trust
Allotments of the White Earth Anishinaabeg, 15 SAMPLE AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 93 (1991).
' Leerberg, supra note 126, at 867.
115 Raysor, supra note 12, at 537-39; see also Leerberg, supra note 126, at 891 ("FETRA effects a tak-
ing of the quota holders' property interest in their quota rights and does not provide just compensa-
tion.").
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gave the tobacco industry increased leverage over market price." '36 Today
almost all tobacco is sold by direct contracting with the Big Tobacco, al-
lowing Big Tobacco to completely "dictate the market." '13 This new indus-
trialized system is essentially the same as the stripped-down streamline
market in the chicken and hog industry138 :
Under this contracting system, a tobacco company functions as a bank that
gives a farmer credit in the form of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, and technical sup-
port at the beginning of the year. In exchange for this tangible credit, the
farmer agrees to sell his crop to that company. At the end of the growing sea-
son, the company's leaf buyers determine the grade or quality of the farmer's
tobacco leaf. Because the price of tobacco leaf depends on the grade, the com-
pany is essentially able to set the price of the tobacco. Often, the company's
payment to the farmer is less than the value of the initial credit, creating a vi-
cious cycle in which farmers fall into debt, continue growing tobacco in an at-
tempt to repay their debt, and, as a result, become even further indebted. Addi-
tionally, almost all direct contracts with tobacco companies stipulate that
farmers assume the production risk of growing tobacco, including "all loss and
damage to the crop due to bad weather." This stipulation is less kind than the
original price support system, which aimed to protect farmers from uncontrol-
lable natural causes that wreaked havoc on their crops. As a result of this ex-
ploitive contracting system, many farmers may be growing tobacco involuntari-
ly, unable to break free of the cycle of debt.139
But this is not the end of Big Tobacco's FETRA benefit. It turns out, the
$200 billion windfall that the states obtained in the MSA, too, was not actu-
ally intended to come from Big Tobacco, as far as Big Tobacco was con-
cerned.140 As can be expected, in the months shortly after the tobacco set-
tlements went public Big Tobacco's share prices fell steeply. 141 Between
2002 and 2003, for example, R.J. Reynolds' share price fell from $70 to
$27 per share. 142  In 2003, however, Big Tobacco explained to its share-
holders that "it had strategies in place" to remain profitable. 143 One of these
"strategies," discussed above, was lobbying for Contraband Statutes that
136 DANIEL J. ROSENBAUM, RICHARD L. BARNES & STANTON A. GLANTz, A FEW MORE LAPS To Go:
TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL INFLUENCE, PUBLIC HEALTH ADVOCACY AND TOBACCO CONTROL
POLICY MAKING IN INDIANA 1893-2010, CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RES. & EDUC. 88 (Oct. 2010).
" Raysor, supra note 12, at 542.
138 See Christina Rogers, Smoking Out a New Venture, DAILY PRESS, Oct. 30, 2006, at C2.
139 Anna R. Kuperstein, Tobacco's Weakest Link: Why Tobacco Farmers Are Essential Players in the
Fight Against Big Tobacco, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 103, 107-08 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
140 See Raysor, supra note 12, at 528-29 ("At first blush, th[e MSA] may seem like a major blow to the
profits of the tobacco companies. However, the true brunt of the MSA payments were going to be
passed down the supply line as the cigarette companies would charge more for the cigarettes and recoup
the money from the consumers.").
... Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 447 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (S.D. N.Y. 2004).
142 Id.
143 Id.
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helped to enforce the Escrow Statutes, thus ensuring that nonparticipating
manufacturers had "equivalent obligations" to pay under the MSA, creating
something close to price parity. 144
Big Tobacco's second strategy was to use the MSA's NPM Adjustment
provision to actually make money. The NPM Adjustment, recall, provides
for a potential reduction in Big Tobacco's annual payments to the states if
there is an "aggregate market share loss" to nonparticipating manufactur-
ers. 145 In addition, if the NPM Adjustment is triggered, payments into the
settlement fund are not merely reduced proportionally. For example, if Big
Tobacco lost 10 percent of its market share to a new entrant or other com-
pany that did not sign the MSA, it would be able to reduce its payments by
as much as 24 percent. 146 As the NPM Adjustment was explained by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Tritent Int'l v. Kentucky:
[T]he NPM Adjustment... provides that the payments by [Big Tobacco] to the
settling states may be adjusted according to the "NPM Adjustment Percentage."
According to this provision, if a nationally recognized firm of economic con-
sultants determines that [Big Tobacco] ha[s] lost market share as a result of
compliance with the MSA, [Big Tobacco]'s required payments to the settling
states will be reduced to account for the loss. The NPM Adjustment therefore
gives the settling states an incentive to protect the market dominance of [Big
Tobacco], because otherwise the settling states themselves will receive less
funds. 14 7
Under this provision, then, if Big Tobacco raised its cigarette prices to a
level that not only made up for any monies paid out to the states, but that
actually created a large profit, it might be able to "shed" some market share
to the nonparticipating manufacturers - who, because of the Escrow and
Contraband Statutes, are not able to completely undercut them - while at
the same time lowering their MSA payments. In essence, through manipu-
lation by Big Tobacco, the NPM Adjustment was reduced to "an agreement
among competitors to allow rival [manufacturers] to flourish in an attempt
to trigger the NPM Adjustment to reduce their own MSA payments. 148
'44 Id. at 240-41
'45 Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2005).
146 A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co. v. Philip Morris Inc., 263 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Hanoch
Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 381
(2000)).
'4 Tritent Int'l v. Kentucky, 467 F.3d 547, 550-51 (6th Cir. 2006); see also A.D. Bedell Wholesale Co.,
263 F.3d at 244 n. 18 (quoting text of the NPM Adjustment).
14' Grand River Enter. Six Nations, Ltd. v. King, 783 F. Supp. 2d 516, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also id.
at 527 (discussing an export report concluding the same); Freedom Holdings Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d at
255 ("[T]he allocation of substantial payments among [Big Tobacco] according to their relative market
share, with adjustments that vary directly with their sales volume, provides a disincentive to gain market
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This strategy appears to be working. Since 1998, Big Tobacco has seen
its sales reduced by roughly 24 percent, losing 12 percent of its market
share. 149 At the same time, however, Big Tobacco has doubled the price of
its product 50 - resulting in a substantial net gain.151 Big Tobacco's stock
prices began to rise in May of 2003, and have generally continued in the
same direction since. 152 During the same period, the volume of nonpartici-
pating manufacturers' sales rose roughly 1,271 percent, growing its market
share from 0.5 percent in 1998 to 8.2 percent in 2003.153
This brings our attention to Big Tobacco's FETRA lawsuit that seeks to
force the UDSA "to account for ... non-reporting, unlicensed Native Amer-
ican cigarette manufacturers. '"154 The FETRA, requires the submission of
several reports to the USDA, in order to determine a manufacturer's "mar-
ket share of gross domestic volume. 155 Big Tobacco counts on these num-
bers being as high as possible, so that they can trigger the NPM Adjustment
under the MSA. The FETRA lawsuit, in other words is not about a
$400,000 reduction in FETRA payments. It is about forcing tribes to be
complicit in Big Tobacco's plot to dupe states out of even more MSA mon-
ey.
CONCLUSION
The practical effects stemming from the new era of MSA assault are po-
tentially (and likely) devastating for states and tribes alike. In the future,
state attorneys general should not be so hasty. A seven-day deadline im-
share at each other's expense and an incentive to increase their prices, rather than their output, as the
way to maximize their profits. Thus, as plaintiffs argue, [Big Tobacco] ha[s] been increasing their pric-
es even beyond that necessary to recoup their payments to the states, while experiencing decreased sales
volume and market share.").
'4 Freedom Holdings Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
15S ee U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., TOBACCO AT A CROSSROAD, A CALL FOR ACTION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMPROVING ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN COMMUNITIES DEPENDENT ON
TOBACCO PRODUCTION WHILE PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH 9 (2000) (finding that since the beginning
of 1998, the major U.S. cigarette companies have increased their prices by more than $1.10 per pack,
more than doubling the price of an average pack of cigarettes.); Christopher David Gray, Troubled Ore-
gon Counties Turn to Cigarette Tax for Public Health, LUND REPORT (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www.thel
undreport.org/content/troubled-oregon-counties-turn-cigarette-tax-public-health ("[T]obacco companies
have increased their prices by $2 since 1998, almost doubling their revenue per pack ... ").
'.' Michael Felberbaum, Reynolds' Net Rises on Higher Cigarette Prices, YAHOO FINANCE (Oct. 21,
2014, 9:45 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/reynolds-net-rises-higher-cigarette-120431602.html.
152 Freedom Holdings Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d at 240-41.
'51 Id. at 239-40.
'54 USDA Complaint, supra note 95, at 4.
155 United States v. Belcorp of Am., Inc., No. 09-21472-Civ., 2010 WL 2301798, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 8,
2010); see also 7 U.S.C. § 518d(h) (2012); 7 C.F.R. § 1463.7 (2014).
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posed by Big Tobacco should not "pressure" states to do anything. 156 Ra-
ther, legislative pre-approval, via the enactment of statutes, should carry the
day. 15' The MSA called for the states to enact Qualifying and Contraband
Statutes that should have been reviewed and rejected by the state legisla-
tures based on principles of sovereignty and federalism.1 58  At minimum,
such a debate would have included participation by tribal governments and
financial and public health experts.1 59
The current state of affairs will likely further drive a wedge between
states, tribes, and the federal government; upsetting the delicate balance that
the sovereigns have built up in more recent years. 160  Since the mid-1990s,
states have come to realize that negotiation and agreement with tribes con-
fers mutual benefit.1 61 Unfortunately, however, the MSA's impediments in
regard to nonparticipating manufacturers do not create an exception for
tribal tobacco or tribal sovereignty. Big Tobacco has insisted that states at-
tack tribal sovereignty, and that they do so "diligently." For its part, the
federal government - flouting its duty to "afford protection" against state
intrusion upon tribal sovereignty - has colluded with Big Tobacco. 162
Federal agents often scoff at assertions of tribal sovereignty,1 63 likely for
156 Cf BRANDT, supra note 29, at 431 ("Although [states' Attorneys General] continued to support state-
by-state litigation to resolve the suits, arguing that the states that had negotiated individual settlements
had achieved more, the pressures bringing the attorneys general into the [MSA] were intense.").
151 See generally Christopher Schroeder, The Multistate Settlement Agreement and the Problem of Social
Regulation Beyond the Power of State Government, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 612 (2001).
158 See generally Wenona T. Singel, The First Federalists, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 775 (2014) (calling for an
"engagement of federalism's values in judicial review of tribal jurisdictional disputes").
15' Gabriel S. Galanda, Advancing the State-Tribal Consultation Mandate, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY,
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/10/17/advancing-state-tribal-consultation-mandate
(last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
160 See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 253, 282
(2010) (noting that through compacting and federal self-determination legislation, the Nation has
"achiev[ed] what could be called cooperative tri-federalism: a version of federalism involving the tribes,
the federal government, and the states.").
161 See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Retiring the Deadliest Enemies Model of Tribal-State Rela-
tions, 43 TULSA L. REV. 73 (2007). This includes, for example, tax revenues, economic development
projects, law enforcement cooperatives, and even new roads and infrastructure. See, e.g., Dick Clever,
Tribal Business: Powerhouse of Tulalips Lights a County, PUGET SOUND Bus. J. (May 17, 2013, 3:00
PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/print-edition/2013/05/17/Powerhouse-of-tulalips-lights-a-count
y.html?page=all (discussing an interlocal agreement to rebuild a road system).
162 Gale Courey Toensing, Big Tobacco Rewrites Nebraska Law to Subvert Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (May 14, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/05/14/big-tobacco
-rewrites-nebraska-law-subvert-tribal-sovereignty-34019; Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph W. Singer, Myths
and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 3 (John F. Kennedy
Scli of Gov't Faculty Research Working Papers Series, Paper No. RWP04-016, 2004) available at htp
://www.mynafsa.org/wp-content/uploads/201 1/10/Myths-and-Realities-of-Tribal-Sovereignty.pdf.
163 See, e.g., Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Nation v. Holder, No. CV- 11-3028-RMP,
2012 WL 893913, at *3-4 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2012).
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their own personal or professional benefit. Further, federal legislation, par-
ticularly the FETRA, the STOP Act, and the Contraband Cigarette Traffick-
ing Act ("CCTA"), 164 require tribes to play an instructive part in ensuring
that Big Tobacco gets out from under the MSA scot-free, and that Indian
tobacco manufacturers experience the brunt of the sanctions supposedly
levied upon Big Tobacco. 165
Furthermore, states - despite their best efforts to cower to Big Tobacco
- will teeter on bankruptcy, and some of will fall. States already receive
reductions to their bond and credit ratings, which has increased costs and
reduced the ability to raise funds through issuing other bonds. Indeed,
roughly 79 percent of these bonds are now rated by Moody's at "B1" or
lower, 166 ranking on the bottom of Moody's scale as "speculative" and
"subject to high credit risk."-16 7
In considering the first iteration of the MSA, Senator Judd Gregg, chair-
man and ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee, had this to say
about the deal:
[S]ignificant, I think, is the fact that ... we are claiming that we are actually
harming the tobacco companies. This argument is being made in the market-
place of ideas around here that this tobacco bill is somehow, in some way, an
attack on big tobacco, when with the immunity language in it, it is just the op-
posite - it is a protective blanket. It is an iron curtain of protection for big to-
bacco .... [W]e made a deal with the devil - or somebody made a deal with
the devil .... I just wanted to highlight that at this point because I think the de-
bate has gotten a little topsy-turvy. It is a little topsy-turvy when a bill is giv-
ing, for the first time in the history of our Nation, and in the jurisprudence his-
tory of our Nation, product liability protection of immense value to an industry
that has produced a product that is inherently deadly and is addictive and is tar-
geted on kids - the first time we are going to do that, and that bill is, for some
reason, perceived as being anti-tobacco. It is not anti-tobacco. It is actually
very pro-tobacco. 1
6 8
'64 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 378 (2012); 7 U.S.C. § 518 (2012).
165 See, e.g., Grey Poplars Inc. v. Brands of Cigarettes, 282 F.3d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The fact
that the CCTA refers to state law of taxation does not make it any less a federal statute... [T]he CCTA
is a federal statute of general applicability and it applies equally to Indians, even on the reservation...
."); Nichole Friedrichs, Northeast Region Update, FED. INDIAN LAW, Spring 2012, at 9; Oliver J.
Semans, The Stop Act is an Encroachment on Tribal Sovereignty, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA
NETWORK, http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2012/04/10/stop-act-encroachment-tribal-sover
eignty (last visited Mar. 2, 2015).
166 Hillary Flynn, Strategists Concerned Muni Investors Can't Manage Tobacco Bonds' Risk, BOND
BUYER (May 8, 2014, 5:14 PM), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/123 89/strategists-concerned-muni-
investors-cant-manage-tobacco-bonds-risk-1062321-1.html.
167 MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., MOODY'S RATING SYMBOLS & DEFINITIONS 8 (2009).
168 144 CONG. REC. S4953 (May 18, 1998) (statement of Sen. Judd Gregg).
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In the words of Judge Richard Posner, "a deal with the devil is always a
Faustian pact."'69 Today, the states and the federal government are reaping
the seeds sewn by that Faustian pact, and Big Tobacco is taking it to the
bank. Not to be outdone in malevolency, Wall Street is also in on the deal.
Tribal governments and industry, meanwhile, are neglected afterthoughts,
punished for the mistakes of Big Tobacco.
In 1998, Professors Mark R. Tonelli and Leonard D. Hudson remarked
on the MSA: "[B]efore we make any deal with the devil, we best remember
Faustus. If the devil is still around in 25 years, we will certainly regret hav-
ing signed on the dotted line today."1 70 Today, states, tribes, and the federal
government have been pitted against each other on the tobacco front. Ac-
cording to the most recent analysis, it is almost certain that "tobacco bonds
will default in the not too distant future .... as early as mid-2020s and ear-
ly-2030s. 1 1' 71 I think it is safe to say that we already regret signing that dot-
ted line - if we going to are honest about the costs of the MSA, we should
be.
169 Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2004).
... Mark R. Tonelli & Leonard D. Hudson, A Faustian Pact with Tobacco Industry, SEATTLE TIMES
(Feb. 12, 1998), http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19980212&slug=2733976.
'.' Flynn, supra note 166.
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